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Abstract
Edge computing pushes application logic and the underlying data to the edge of the network, with the
aim of improving availability and scalability. As the edge servers are not necessarily secure, there must be
provisions for users to validate the results—that values in the result tuples are not tampered with, that no
qualifying data are left out, that no spurious tuples are introduced, and that a query result is not actually
the output from a diﬀerent query. This paper aims to address the challenges of ensuring data integrity in
edge computing. We study three schemes that enable users to check the correctness of query results pro-
duced by the edge servers. Two of the schemes are our original contributions, while the third is an adap-
tation of existing work. Our study shows that each scheme oﬀers diﬀerent security features, and imposes
diﬀerent demands on the edge servers, user machines, and interconnecting network. In other words, all
three schemes are useful for diﬀerent application requirements and resource conﬁgurations.
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1. Introduction
Many Web services are served from central locations, and could suﬀer from a number of bot-
tlenecks ranging from Web and database server loads, to network delays. Server overloads can
usually be alleviated through load balancing on a server farm. In contrast, network latencies
are usually beyond the control of the Web service operators, as traﬃc to and from remote users
has to pass through long-haul networks operated by multiple network providers that are often
congested. Although aggressive build-up in recent years by telecommunication companies has ex-
panded the capacity of the long-haul networks, new technologies like Gigabit ethernet are making
bandwidth much more aﬀordable in the Metropolitan Area Networks (MAN). Given the relative
price-performance of Wide Area Networks (WAN) versus MAN, the logical approach to reduce
network latency is to push the Web services to the users, into the MANs.
Edge computing is being promoted as a strategy to achieve scalable and highly available Web
services (e.g., [1]). Fig. 1 shows the generic architecture of an edge computing platform. It pushes
business logic and data processing from central data centers, out to proxy servers at the ‘‘edge’’ of
the network and within the MANs. There are several potential advantages: Running applications
at the edge cuts down network latency and produces faster responses to user applications and
partners Web services. Adding edge servers near user clusters is also likely to be a cheaper way
to achieve scalability than fortifying the servers in the central data center and provisioning more
network bandwidth for every user. Finally, by lowering the dependency on a central data center,
edge computing removes the single point of failure in the infrastructure, reducing its susceptibility
to denial of service attacks and improving service availability.
In theory, edge computing is a natural extension of the Content Delivery Network (CDN)
architecture [2,3]. In practice, pushing application logic to edge servers introduces a number of
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Fig. 1. Edge computing set-up.
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technical challenges, one of which is data security: For applications that run on a database, edge
computing entails the replication of (parts of) the database, to edge servers that perform query
processing on behalf of the central DBMS. Since the edge servers are not necessarily as secure
as the central data center, there must be provisions to check the integrity of query results pro-
duced by the edge servers; speciﬁcally,
• Authenticity—The query results originate from a server or cluster authorized by the master
DBMS, and have not been tampered with.
• Accuracy—No spurious tuples are introduced and no qualifying data are left out. Moreover,
no user is intentionally given the output from a diﬀerent query.
To illustrate, a ﬁnancial information provider could push historical stock prices, together with
analytics software, to edge servers operated by partner ISPs (Internet Service Provider). Such an
arrangement enables users to run diﬀerent pricing and risk models oﬀ the edge servers directly in-
stead of depending on a central data center that might be situated thousands of miles away, thus
achieving superior responses by reducing communication latency and processing bottlenecks. To
keep out unauthorized users, the data and analytics software could be protected via encryption
and access control. At the same time, legitimate users who act on the results produced by the ana-
lytics software for investment decisions or recommendations would also demand assurance of the
integrity of the results.
Contributions: This paper aims to address the challenges of ensuring the integrity of relational
database query results generated by edge servers in an edge computing platform. We introduce
two novel schemes where the master DBMS can empower a group of edge servers to collectively
certify query results, on the premise that (if necessary) the edge servers can be running diﬀerent
operating systems and protected by diﬀerent security products (i.e., ﬁrewall, intrusion detection,
etc.), thus increasing the diﬃculty for attackers to breach all the edge servers concurrently without
being detected. One of the schemes requires the edge servers to execute each query and aﬃx partial
signatures separately; the partial signatures are then combined into a ﬁnal signature for the query
result. In the other scheme, only one edge server needs to process each query; while producing the
query result, the edge server also compiles a set of digests from a pool that has been pre-generated
by the master DBMS, such that the assembled digests are adequate for a group of edge servers to
check and certify the query result.
To proﬁle the security properties and resource requirements of the proposed schemes, we com-
pare them against a third scheme that is adapted from existing work. Our study shows that the
three schemes present diﬀerent security and resource tradeoﬀs, and are useful for diﬀerent appli-
cation scenarios and resource conﬁgurations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces our target deployment
model and the associated security threats, in addition to related work on data authentication, with
particular emphasis on authentication in database systems. Our proposed authentication mecha-
nisms are presented in Section 3. Following that, Section 4 analyzes the relative cost-performance
characteristics of the alternative mechanisms. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and discusses
avenues for future work.
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2. Background
This section begins by deﬁning the target system deployment model, and the associated security
threats. Following that, we deﬁne a couple of cryptographic primitives that will be used in our
authentication mechanisms, before summarizing related work.
2.1. System model
Fig. 1 shows the set-up of a generic edge computing environment. The central server that hosts
the master database is located within a professionally managed data center. Thus we assume that
the central server is secure and always available, and that attacks and other risks to the central
server are beyond the scope of this work. The database (or parts of it) is replicated to servers sit-
uated at the edge of the network, i.e., edge servers, near the users. Updates to the replica can be
achieved using techniques such as those studied in [4,5]. The users and their application clients can
be (though not necessarily are) ﬁrewalled within a trusted LAN and hence protected from external
attackers. Database/SQL queries issued by applications are processed at the edge servers; the re-
sult for each query is returned together with a veriﬁcation object or signature that the client can
use to verify the integrity of the query result. Finally, the edge servers could be operated by third-
parties or they could even reside in a peer-to-peer platform, so it is possible for a hacker to tamper
with the data on the edge servers.
Given that the edge servers are not secured, one security concern is controlling access to the
data. Obviously, an adversary who gains access to the operating system or hardware of the stor-
age server may be able to browse the stored data, or make illegal copies of the data. Solutions to
mitigate this concern include encryption (e.g., [6]) and steganographic storage (e.g., [7]), and are
complementary to the authentication schemes that we propose here.
Our primary concern in this paper is the threat to the integrity of query results that arises from
the exposed edge servers. For example, an adversary who is cognizant of the data organization in
the storage server may attempt to make logical alterations to the data; an example is to illegally
eﬀect fund transfers between two accounts. Even if the data organization is hidden, for example
through data encryption or steganographic schemes [8,7], the adversary may still sabotage the
database by overwriting physical pages within the storage volume. Therefore it is essential to pro-
vide mechanisms for users to verify the integrity of the query results returned.
2.2. Cryptographic primitives
Our proposed solutions to achieve trusted data dissemination in the face of the threats de-
scribed above, and also many of the related work, are based on the following two cryptographic
primitives:
Hash function: A one-way hash function, denoted as h(Æ), works in one direction: it is easy to
compute a hash value h(m) from a pre-image m; however, it is hard to ﬁnd a pre-image that hashes
to a particular hash value. A hash function is collision-resistant if it is hard to ﬁnd two diﬀerent
pre-images m1 and m2 such that h(m1) = h(m2). SHA-256 [9] is an example of a one-way, collision-
resistant hash function. We will use the terms hash, hash value and message digest
interchangeably.
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Digital signature: A digital signature algorithm is a cryptographic tool for authenticating the
integrity of the signed message as well as its origin. In the algorithm, a signer keeps a private
key secret and publishes the corresponding public key. The private key is used by the signer
to generate digital signatures on messages, while the public key is used by anyone to verify
the signatures on messages. RSA [10] and DSA [11] are two commonly used signature
algorithms.
(k,n) Threshold signature scheme: The (k,n) threshold RSA signature scheme as proposed in
[12] is deﬁned as follows:
• Key share generation: During system set-up, a dealer generates a RSA public key pk along with
the corresponding private key share ski and public veriﬁcation key vki for party i, i = 1,2, . . . ,n.
In practice, the dealer may be a computer or a tamper-resistant device trusted by all parties.
The dealer distributes the private key shares as well as the veriﬁcation keys among the parties,
and subsequently erases its copy of the private key shares.
• Signature share generation: Given a message m, party i, i = 1,2, . . . ,n, generates a signature
share ri(m) using its private key share ski, along with a ‘‘proof-of-correctness’’ qi of the signa-
ture share based on its veriﬁcation key vki.
• Signature share combination and signature veriﬁcation: Given the message m, any k signature
shares rj(m) and their proof-of-correctness qj, for j = 1,2, . . . ,k, anyone can verify the correct-
ness of the individual signature shares. If the k shares are all veriﬁed to be correct, they are
combined to form the ﬁnal signature rC(m), which is a standard RSA signature and can be ver-
iﬁed by the RSA public key pk.
Delegation-by-certiﬁcate proxy signature scheme: Let (pkO, skO) and (pkP, skP) denote the public
and private key pairs of party O and party P under standard signature schemes SO and SP, respec-
tively. The delegation-by-certiﬁcate proxy signature scheme is deﬁned as follows [13]:
• Delegation: In order to designate P as its proxy signer, the original signer O issues a delegation
certiﬁcate to P:
d cert ¼ ðf1jpkP jxjrOÞ
where x is a ‘‘warrant’’ specifying restrictions (e.g., validity period) on the messages that the
proxy signer is allowed to sign, f1 is a ﬂag used to signal that d_cert is a delegation certiﬁcate,
and rO is Os signature on f1jpkPjx using its private key skO under the signature scheme SO.
Veriﬁcation of this signature is then performed by ﬁrst prepending f1 to pkPjx.
• Proxy signature generation: To sign a message m on behalf of O, P computes a signature
rP(f2jpkOjm) on f2jpkOjm using its private key skP under the standard signature scheme SP,
where f2 is a ﬂag indicating that the signature is a proxy signature. We call the combination
of d_cert and rP(f2jpkOjm) the proxy signature.
• Proxy signature veriﬁcation: Given m, d_cert, rP(f2jpkOjm) and authentic copies of pkO and
pkP, a veriﬁer ﬁrst checks the validity of d_cert relative to pkO, and then the validity of
the proxy signature rP(f2jpkOjm) on the message m relative to pkP. Only when both veriﬁca-
tions succeed, will the veriﬁer consider the message m as having been authenticated/signed
by O.
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2.3. Related work
This paper builds upon the work by Merkle in [14]. We shall explain the Merkle hash tree with
the example in Fig. 2, which is intended for authenticating data values d1, . . . ,d4. Each leaf node
Ni is assigned a digest h(di), where h is a one-way hash function. The value of each internal node is
derived from its child nodes, e.g., N12 = h(N1jN2) where j denotes concatenation. In addition, the
value of the root node is signed. The tree can be used to authenticate any subset of the data values,
in conjunction with a veriﬁcation object (VO). For example, to authenticate d1, the VO contains
N2, N34 and the signed N1234. The recipient ﬁrst computes h(d1) and h(h(h(d1)jN2)jN34), then
checks if the latter is the same as the signed N1234. If so, d1 is accepted; otherwise, d1 has been
tampered with.
Merkle hash trees have inspired many proposals on data authentication, including certifying
selective retrievals of XML documents [15,16], for proving the presence or absence of public
key certiﬁcates on revocation lists [17,18], and for authenticating JPEG2000 images [19]. The pro-
posal that is most closely related to our work is [20], which describes a scheme for verifying query
results produced by untrusted third-party publishers. The scheme calls for the data owner to peri-
odically distribute signed digests directly to users. The digests are hashes computed recursively
over tree indices on the owners database. To prove that the answer to a query is correct, the pub-
lisher constructs a VO using the same tree index that the owner used to compute the signed digest.
The VO provides a hard-to-forge proof that links the answer to the signed digest.
This work by Devenbu et al. [20] is among the ﬁrst few papers to address the authentication of
query results in database systems. However, when applied directly in our context of edge comput-
ing, their scheme poses a number of limitations that we aim to overcome: First, a Merkle tree is
needed for each of the 2a sort-orders on a table with a attributes; this incurs large storage over-
heads in the database implementation, and makes updates very expensive. Second, a VO needs to
contain links all the way to the digest for the root of the tree index. This means that the VO grows
linearly to the query result and logarithmically to the base table, which can be quite sizable for
large databases. Another potential problem is that projections have to be performed by the clients,
which leads to wasteful data transfers especially if the ﬁltered attributes are BLOBs. Finally, the
approach is weak in terms of access control—even attributes that are supposed to be ﬁltered out
through projection must be oﬀered to users for veriﬁcation. Moreover, to check for completeness,
tuples beyond the left and right boundaries of the query result must be exposed to the user; this
would undermine any tuple-based access control on the database.
N1234 = h(N12 | N34)
N12 =
h(N1 | N2)
N34 =
h(N3 | N4)
N1 = h(d1) N2 = h(d2) N3 = h(d3) N4 = h(d4)
Fig. 2. Example of a Merkle hash tree.
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A more recent work by Roos et al. [21] also employs the Merkle hash tree to authenticate range
queries. However, the focus of that paper is on encoding the VO in a more compact form to min-
imize communication overhead; it has the same limitations as the scheme in [20].
Finally, in [22], Barbara et al. proposed a diﬀerent mechanism for detecting unauthorized
changes to a database. The mechanism derives a checksum for every record, followed by an over-
all database checksum from the record checksums. As long as the database checksum is secured,
the database cannot be tampered with without being detected. This mechanism is designed to sup-
port data authentication by the DBMS itself, not by the recipient of query results. Hence it is not
directly applicable here.
3. Trusted data dissemination networks
In this section, we present three data dissemination solutions that enable query results produced
by edge servers to be checked by users for authenticity and accuracy (as deﬁned in Section 1).
The ﬁrst solution requires no security guarantees from the edge servers. The second mechanism
recognizes that while no edge server by itself is secure enough, some minimum number of edge
servers can be trusted to process a query, then collectively certify the result. This is based on
the observation that if necessary the edge servers can be running diﬀerent operating systems
and protected by diﬀerent security products, thus increasing the diﬃculty for attackers to compro-
mise all the edge servers concurrently without being detected. The third scheme combines the ﬁrst
two, in such a way that a single edge server produces the query results and forwards them to a
cluster of veriﬁers for certiﬁcation.
Of the three alternatives, the ﬁrst is adapted from [20]: Instead of building a separate Merkle
tree, we integrate it with the B+-tree to avoid incurring extra I/Os in retrieving and searching sep-
arate index structures. To make the scheme more practical, we also change the veriﬁcation pro-
cedure to eliminate the need to maintain a Merkle tree for every sort order on a table. The
other two schemes are our original contributions.
3.1. Untrusted edge processor (UEP)
The ﬁrst scheme, Untrusted Edge Processor (UEP), imposes no security requirement on the
edge servers. Instead, the master DBMS distributes to the edge servers a hierarchy of digests with
each database table, in which the root digest is signed with the private key of the master DBMS
using a digital signature scheme. Based on these digests, an edge server generates an appropriate
veriﬁcation object (VO) to accompany each query result. The recipient then check the integrity of
the query result, by deriving from it and the VO a digest to match against the signed root digest.
Without the master DBMS private key, it is computationally infeasible for the edge server to
introduce spurious tuples or to alter the result while still producing a VO that matches the signed
root digest. UEP is representative of the various Merkle hash tree-based solutions, like [20,23,24],
etc.
The UEP scheme is depicted in Fig. 3. As shown in the ﬁgure, the master DBMS distributes the
database and certiﬁed B-trees (CB-tree) (adapted from [24]) to the edge servers. The CB-tree is
essentially a combination of the B+-tree and the Merkle tree [14]. Speciﬁcally, each child pointer
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in the tree index is augmented with a digest of all the tuple values in the underlying subtree, as
shown in Fig. 4. The root digest, dr, is certiﬁed with the master DBMS private key. Details of
the construction of the CB-tree are as follows:
• For each tuple t in a database table, compute digest dt:
dt ¼ hðDBnamejtablenamejrecordvalueÞ
where h is a one-way hash function on the concatenation of the database name, the table name,
and the value of the tuple. dt is stored with the corresponding tuple pointer in the leaf node of the
B+-tree, as in nodes 3 and 4 in Fig. 4.
Master
DBMS
Internet User
Query Result + VO
Data + 
CB-tree
Untrusted
Edge
Processor
Fig. 3. Untrusted edge processor.
Root
Tuples
…
Node 3
t1 t2 t3 t4
d5 = h(t1) d6 d7 d8 = h(t4)
Node 4
Node 1
d1 = h(...|d3|d4|...)
d3 = h(...|d5|d6) d4 = h(d7|d8|...)
Catalog
d2 = h(…)
dr = h(…|d1|d2|…)
Fig. 4. Certiﬁed B-tree.
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• For each leaf node N, a digest dN is derived from the tuple digests within N, i.e.,
dN ¼ hðdt1j    jdtij   Þ
dN is stored with the corresponding child pointer in Ns parent. An example is node 1 in Fig. 4.
• Similarly, for each internal node N, a digest dN is computed from the digests dNis associated
with the node pointers within N:
dN ¼ hðdN1j    jdNij   Þ
Again, dN in turn is stored with the corresponding child pointer in Ns parent.
• Finally, a root digest dr is computed for the root node, and signed with the master DBMS pri-
vate key so that it cannot be altered by unauthorized parties.
Whenever a user query arrives, the edge server performs query evaluation as in a conventional
DBMS. Each table is accessed through its CB-tree, and the digests that are needed for authen-
tication are collected into the VO while the edge server traverses down the CB-tree. Starting
from the root node, the digests for all the branches other than the child node in the query path
are included in the VO. This continues until the edge server reaches the smallest subtree that
covers all the result tuples, also known as the enveloping subtree. For each node along both
boundaries of the enveloping subtree, the digests for all the branches that do not lead to any
result tuple are added to the VO. If the result tuples do not occupy one contiguous key range,
for example in the case of a multi-point query, the ‘‘gaps’’ in between the result tuples also have
to be accounted for. This is done by inserting into the VO, for each such gap, the digest for the
top node of the largest subtree that covers the gap but not any result tuple. (By catering for such
gaps in the key range, we eliminate the need to maintain a CB-tree for every sort order on a
table as in [20].)
To illustrate, suppose the query result comprises tuples t1, t2, t3 and t4 in Fig. 4. The VO would
include:
• digests for all the tuples under node 3 other than t1 and t2, so that the veriﬁer can compute d3;
• digests for all the tuples under node 4 other than t3 and t4, so that the veriﬁer can compute d4;
• digests for all the nodes under node 1, other than nodes 3 and 4, so that the veriﬁer can com-
pute d1;
• digests for all the nodes under the root, other than node 1, so that the veriﬁer can compute dr;
and
• the certiﬁed dr for the veriﬁer to match against its computed dr.
Moreover, the tree structure is also recorded in the VO to enable the veriﬁer to combine the
digests in the correct order. Since the VO contains digests for the nodes along the path from
the root to the leaf node(s), the size of the VO grows logarithmically to the table size [24].
Unlike tuples that are ﬁltered out by selection operations, attributes that are excluded through
projection operations cannot simply be dropped from the result. This is because all attribute val-
ues in the selected tuples are needed to compute the tuple digests during veriﬁcation. Therefore,
for each attribute of a selected tuple, either the data value or its digest must be returned as part of
the VO, depending on the relative size of the attribute versus the digest.
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In the case of a join operation, the edge server will not return the ﬁnal join result. Instead, for
each table targeted by the join, the edge server sends back the qualifying tuples with an accom-
panying VO. This allows the user client to verify each contributing sub-table, before performing
the ﬁnal join operation(s) on the sub-tables.
Security features: Suppose an adversary tampers with the database by altering the existing tu-
ples. There are conceptually two ways that he can attempt to avoid detection:
• He can try to ensure that every altered tuple still produces the same digest. By the deﬁnition of
one-way hash function, it is computationally infeasible to determine the input argument that
would lead to a given digest, hence this is not a feasible option.
• He can modify the digests leading from each tampered tuple, all the way up to the root
node. However, the digest of the root node is signed with a digital signature, and without
the private key of the DBMS the adversary is not able to produce another valid, signed root
digest.
Similarly, inserting or deleting a tuple would trigger a change to a leaf node, and possibly more
changes up the CB-tree if there are node splits or merges. These changes cannot escape detection
as the adversary is not able to compensate for the mismatch between the new node content and its
previous digest.
Therefore, we conclude that the UEP scheme is eﬀective in detecting any spurious tuples or
tampered data values introduced by a compromised edge server.
Another desirable data authentication feature would have been to ascertain that no qualifying
tuples are left out of a query answer. To achieve that, all the result tuples must occupy one con-
tiguous range under a CB-tree (see [20] for detailed explanation). This requires a CB-tree to be
created on every attribute that may be queried, which entails signiﬁcant space and maintenance
overheads. Moreover, for a query that involves selections on multiple attributes in a table, only
one selection can be carried out by the edge server; the remaining selections have to be pushed
to the recipient. (Constructing a CB-tree with a search key that concatenates those attributes does
not work, because the qualifying tuples may not occupy one contiguous range under such a CB-
tree.) More importantly, boundary tuples (tuples to the immediate left and right of the key range)
must be oﬀered to the user for inspection. This would undermine any tuple-based access control.
With these limitations, we decided that it is impractical to build into UEP the ability to verify that
all qualifying tuples are included in the query answers.
Finally, UEP is vulnerable to query result substitution, where a compromised edge processor
passes oﬀ output from a diﬀerent query as result for a user query.
3.2. Trusted cluster processors (TCP)
While the edge servers are not as secure as the master DBMS and hence may be compromised
individually, in practice it is less likely for an intruder to gain control of several edge servers simul-
taneously without being detected. The reason is that attacks typically exploit weaknesses in par-
ticular system implementations, so they are not likely to succeed against all the edge servers if they
are installed with diﬀerent operating systems and protected by diﬀerent security products (i.e., ﬁre-
wall, intrusion detection, etc.). Although in practice there are limited choices of diﬀerent operating
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systems and proven security products, there are still enough combinations to set up small clusters
of, say, a dozen edge servers each, that oﬀer suﬃcient robustness and availability.
Based on this observation, the trusted cluster processors (TCP) solution permits a pre-speciﬁed
minimum number of edge servers to independently process a query and collectively endorse the
authenticity of the result on behalf of the master DBMS. This is achieved using a novel combina-
tion of a (k,n) threshold signature scheme and a proxy signature scheme.
A (k,n) threshold signature scheme is a cryptographic tool that allows any subset of k out of n
parties to generate a signature on a message, but prevents the creation of a valid signature by few-
er than k parties. Since it was ﬁrst proposed in [25], threshold signature has been studied exten-
sively. However, in most of the schemes, either the signature share generation or veriﬁcation is
interactive, thus requiring a synchronous communication network, or the size of each individual
signature share grows linearly in the number of parties. In this paper, we employ the (k,n) thres-
hold RSA signature scheme proposed in [12] as it enjoys the following desirable properties:
T1 Unforgeability—Any subset of k out of n parties can generate a signature, but fewer than k
parties cannot generate a valid signature.
T2 Robustness—Invalid signature shares from corrupted parties can be detected so as to prevent
them from disrupting signature generation by uncorrupted parties.
T3 Non-interactivity—Signature share generation and veriﬁcation can be completely non-
interactive.
T4 Compact share size—The size of an individual signature share is bounded by a small constant
times the size of the RSA modulus.
T5 The resulting signature is a standard RSA signature.
T1 and T2 are proved in the random oracle model [12], T3 and T4 are essential in maintaining
good system performance in practical applications, and T5 allows any client to verify the signa-
ture as long as it supports the standard RSA signature scheme. The deﬁnition of (k,n) threshold
RSA signature scheme is given in Section 2.2.
A straightforward implementation of TCP is for the master DBMS to hand over its private key
to each cluster, and have the n processors within the cluster share the private key based on the
(k,n) threshold RSA scheme. Any k processors in the cluster can then collectively produce the
master DBMSs signature. However, this approach is not a prudent security practice since it gives
the cluster unlimited signing power. We overcome the problem by employing a proxy signature
scheme that permits the master DBMS to delegate its signing rights to the cluster in a tightly con-
trolled manner.
Since its introduction in [26], many proxy signature schemes have been proposed and broken.
In this paper, we use the delegation-by-certiﬁcate proxy signature scheme proposed in [13] which
is summarized in Section 2.2. We choose this scheme for three reasons: First, its conceptual sim-
plicity makes it easy to implement. Second, it works with standard signature schemes (e.g., RSA
or DSA) that are widely supported by existing computing platforms. Third, the scheme is proven
to be secure in [13]. Informally, this proxy signature scheme has the following features:
P1 Veriﬁability—From a proxy signature, a veriﬁer can be convinced of the original signers
(i.e., the master DBMSs) agreement on the signed message.
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P2 Unforgeability—The original signer and third parties who are not designated as the proxy
signer (i.e., the cluster) cannot create a valid proxy signature.
P3 Identiﬁability—Anyone can determine the identity of the proxy signer from a proxy
signature.
P4 Undeniability—The proxy signer cannot repudiate a proxy signature it created.
P5 Prevention of misuse—The proxy signing key cannot be used for purposes other than gener-
ating valid proxy signatures.
Fig. 5 depicts the TCP scheme: For each query, one server within the cluster would serve as the
scheduler, while k of the remaining n servers are picked for query processing. For better availabil-
ity and load balancing, the servers could take turns to be scheduler or query processor for diﬀerent
queries. Here, we extend the delegation-by-certiﬁcate proxy signature scheme by replacing the
proxy signers standard signature scheme with the (k,n) threshold RSA signature scheme. In
the following, we describe the TCP system set-up, runtime operation, and its security features.
System set-up: Let (pkM, skM) denote the public and private key pair of the master DBMS under
a standard signature scheme. Let (pkC, skC) be the public and private key pair of the cluster under
the (k,n) threshold RSA signature scheme. We assume that pkM and pkC are disseminated to the
users through authenticated channels, e.g., via public key certiﬁcates issued by a certiﬁcate author-
ity. Furthermore, we assume that there is an authenticated channel such as SSL between each
query processor and the scheduler, in order to prevent interception and replay attacks in their
midst. The set-up of the TCP scheme involves the following steps:
(1) Distribution of private key share: Based on (pkC, skC), a dealer (e.g., a trusted computer or a
tamper-resistant hardware) generates private key share ski and public veriﬁcation key vki for
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Fig. 5. Trusted cluster processors.
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query processor i, i = 1,2, . . . ,n. The dealer distributes the private key shares and the veriﬁ-
cation keys to the corresponding processors over secure channels and then erases its copy of
the private key and shares.1
(2) Delegation of signing rights: The master DBMS issues a delegation certiﬁcate to the cluster of
n processors, d_cert = (f1jpkCjxjrM), where f1 is a ﬂag used to indicate that d_cert is a dele-
gation certiﬁcate, x is a warrant specifying the validity period of the delegation as well as the
type of query results the cluster is allowed to sign, and rM is the master DBMSs signature on
‘‘f1jpkCjx’’.
Runtime operation: The database and all subsequent updates are disseminated to the n query
processors in the cluster; see [4,5] for example for update propagation techniques. This is done
over a secure communication channel such as a virtual private network. Upon receiving a user
query, the TCP proceeds as follows:
(1) The user query is directed to the clusters scheduler. Taking into account the load level of the
n query processors, the scheduler selects k of them for the query.
(2) Let aj denotes the result of executing the query by selected processor j, j = 1,2, . . . ,k, and
f2 be a ﬂag used to indicate a proxy signature. Processor j generates a signature share
rj(f2jpkMjaj) using its private key share skj, along with a ‘‘proof-of-correctness’’ qj of the
signature share based on its veriﬁcation key vkj. (Note that pkM in rj(f2jpkMjaj) can be
replaced by the unique identiﬁer of the master DBMS without aﬀecting the security property
of the signatures.) Processor j sends aj, rj(f2jpkMjaj) and qj to the scheduler.
(3) With aj, rj(f2jpkMjaj) and qj, "j = 1,2, . . . ,k
• The scheduler checks if the k query results aj are identical; if so, it proceeds to the next step.
Denote the identical result as a.
• The scheduler next veriﬁes the correctness of the signature share rj(f2jpkMja) based on the
proof-of-correctness qj. If the k signature shares are all correct, they are combined to form
the ﬁnal signature rC(f2jpkMja). The scheduler then returns a and the proxy signature
‘‘rC(f2jpkMja), d_cert’’ to the user. Note that rC(f2jpkMja) is a standard RSA signature.
If some of the query results disagree or some of the signature shares cannot be veriﬁed to be
correct, the scheduler will solicit additional results and signature shares from the previously
unused processors. This process continues until k identical results and k correct signature
shares are obtained. Also, the scheduler raises an alarm on those processors that failed to
provide correct result or signature share.
(4) Upon receiving a, rC(f2jpkMja) and d_cert, the user checks the validity of d_cert and
rC(f2jpkMja), respectively. The user accepts the query result a as having been authenticated
by the master DBMS only if the veriﬁcation is successful.
Security features: A query processor can either be intact or corrupted. An intact processor
follows its speciﬁed protocol and returns accurate query results and correct signature shares. In
contrast, a corrupted processor may exhibit Byzantine failures, i.e., it deviates arbitrarily
1 If a trusted dealer is not available, the master DBMS can take on the task of key generation. In that case, the
unforgeability property (P2) applies only to third parties, not to the master DBMS/original signer.
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from its speciﬁed protocol. Byzantine failures are the most severe and the most diﬃcult to deal
with [27].
Assuming that less than k query processors out of n in the cluster are corrupted at any given time,
we claim that the query result a which successfully passes user veriﬁcations on ‘‘rC(f2jpkMja),
d_cert’’ is both authentic and accurate, according to the deﬁnitions at the beginning of this section.
First we note that ‘‘rC(f2jpkMja), d_cert’’ is a proxy signature of the delegation-by-certiﬁcate
proxy signature scheme. From property P2 we know that it is unforgeable. From property P1
we know that the user can be convinced of the master DBMSs agreement on the signed query
result. This proves the authenticity aspect of the query result.
Next, we note that rC(f2jpkMja) is also a threshold signature of the (k,n) threshold RSA signa-
ture scheme. Based on property T1 and Step 3 of the Runtime Operation, a valid threshold sig-
nature rC(f2jpkMja) on the query result can be generated only if k signature shares are veriﬁed to
be correct and the k associated query results are all identical. Consequently, if a valid signature is
generated on an inaccurate query result, then at least k corrupted query processors must have col-
luded, i.e., they all provided the same inaccurate query result but correct signature shares on the
result. However, this contradicts our assumption of having less than k corrupted processors and
proves the accuracy aspect of the claim.
Finally, TCP is not based on Merkle tree or CB-tree, thus it does not share the limitations of
[20] and UEP. In particular, TCP allows a user to conﬁrm that no qualifying tuples are dropped
from the query result, without compromising access control as there is no need to release pro-
jected attribute values or boundary tuples for user inspection here. Moreover, TCP is robust
against query result substitution, as an adversary would need to simultaneously induce the sched-
uler and k of the query processors to return the identical wrong result to escape detection.
3.3. Trusted cluster veriﬁers (TCV)
While the TCP system described above requires several edge servers within a cluster to process
each query concurrently, the trusted cluster veriﬁers (TCV) solution requires only one query pro-
cessor and multiple light-weight veriﬁers per query. The idea is for the query processor to generate
a veriﬁcation object (VO) with each query result, as in UEP, then forward them to some pre-spec-
iﬁed minimum number of veriﬁers for checking. The signature shares returned by those veriﬁers
can then be combined to form a proxy signature for the query result. This eliminates the need for
the user to perform projection, join and VO checking, which could require substantial computa-
tion and storage resources (see Appendix A.1). For better availability and load balancing, the
edge servers in a cluster could take turns to be the query processor or veriﬁer for diﬀerent queries.
The TCV scheme is illustrated in Fig. 6. Here each cluster contains a query processor and n
veriﬁers. This system employs the same delegation-by-certiﬁcate proxy signature scheme and
(k,n) threshold RSA signature scheme as in TCP.
System set-up: The same as in the TCP system, with the only exception that the private key
shares and the public veriﬁcation keys are issued for the n veriﬁers, instead of the n query proces-
sors as in the TCP system.
Runtime operation: The database, CB-trees, and any updates to them are disseminated only to
the query processor in the cluster. When a user query arrives at the cluster, the TCV scheme pro-
ceeds as follows:
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(1) The query processor generates query result a and the accompanying VO (see Section 3.1).
Instead of returning a and VO directly to the user, however, the query processor channels
them to k of the n veriﬁers.
(2) Each selected veriﬁer j, j = 1,2, . . . ,k, ﬁrst checks that a and VO match the signed root digest
and then generates a signature share rj(f2jpkMja) using its private key share skj, along with a
‘‘proof-of-correctness’’ qj of the signature share based on its veriﬁcation key vkj. Veriﬁer j
returns rj(f2jpkMja) and qj to the query processor.
(3) Given rj(f2jpkMja) and qj, "j = 1,2, . . . ,k, the query processor veriﬁes the correctness of each
signature share based on the corresponding proof-of-correctness. If some of the signature
shares are found to be incorrect, the query processor contacts additional veriﬁers to obtain
the missing signature shares. As soon as k correct signature shares are obtained, they are
combined to form the ﬁnal signature rC(f2jpkMja). The scheduler then returns a, rC(f2jpkMja)
and d_cert = (f1jpkCjxjrM) to the user.
(4) Upon receiving a, rC(f2jpkMja) and d_cert, the user checks the validity of d_cert and
rC(f2jpkMja), respectively. The user accepts the query result a as having been authenticated
by the master DBMS only if the veriﬁcation is successful.
In the case of a join operation, the query processor will transmit qualifying tuples in each tar-
geted table, together with an accompanying VO, to the veriﬁers. The veriﬁers will then check the
sub-tables, generate the join result, and ﬁnally sign it for the query processor.
Security features: According to the proof for UEP, it is computationally infeasible to produce a
VO that matches an incorrect query result so as to escape detection by the veriﬁers. Since the ver-
iﬁers cannot be deceived, they will certify an incorrect query answer only if they have been com-
promised. Assuming that there are less than k corrupted veriﬁers at any time, we can show that
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the query result a as certiﬁed by rC(f2jpkMja) and d_cert contains no spurious tuples or tampered
data values. The proof follows a similar reasoning as that for the TCP system and is omitted here.
Although TCV too relies on CB-trees for result veriﬁcation, it is able to let users detect whether
any qualifying tuples have been dropped from the query results, without sacriﬁcing access control
like UEP. This is because here the query processor only needs to oﬀer the projected attribute val-
ues and boundary tuples for inspection by the veriﬁers, not the users. Unfortunately, the price of
having to maintain one CB-tree per database table still applies. In addition, TCV inherits UEP
vulnerability to query result substitution, where a compromised query processor passes oﬀ output
from a diﬀerent query as result for a user query.
4. Experimental study
Having assessed the trusted data dissemination schemes from a security perspective, we now
evaluate their performance trade-oﬀs. We have conducted a series of experiments using dis-
crete-event simulation models of the three architectures depicted in Figs. 3, 5 and 6. The workload
is modelled after a moderate database size of DBSize = 1 GBytes, consisting of #Rec = 2 million
tuples at RecSize = 512 Bytes each. With a standard block size of jBj = 4 KBytes, the fan-out and
height of the B-tree and CB-tree can be derived. The query generation follows a Poisson process
with a mean inter-arrival time of QueryArr ls. Each query introduced into the system has a un-
ique ID for tracking the query ﬂow and response time. These resource and workload parameters
are summarized in Table 1.
We assume a closed system, i.e., the number of EdgeServ and Users are ﬁxed at the beginning of
each experiment. Each user and edge server contains a set of processors where the speed of each
can be stepped up or down by XSpeed times. The in/out buﬀer queue length of each node depends
on the amount of available in/out link bandwidth and the processor speed. We assume an inﬁnite
buﬀer length for the queues, so there are no packet drops. Furthermore, the intranet and internet
links have IntraBW and InterBW Mbps bandwidths, respectively. The signature/digest sizes and
Table 1
Resource and workload models
Parameter Meaning Default
jBj Size of block/node 4 KBytes
jKj Length of search key 16 Bytes
jptrj Size of node pointer 4 Bytes
DBSize Size of database table 1 GBytes
RecSize Length of each tuple 512 Bytes
#Rec Number of tuples 2 mil
#Col Number of attributes 32
fBtree Fan-out factor of B-tree 205
hBtree Height of B-tree 2
fCBtree Fan-out factor of CB-tree 114
hCBtree Height of CB-tree 3
QueryArr Mean query inter-arrival time 1000 s
sfselect Selectivity factor of selection 1 tuple
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computation speeds are taken from the Crypto++ benchmark published at [28], while the disk
parameters are set to published ﬁgures for the IBM 160 GB SATA hard disk. The simulator is
run for a total of SimTime seconds, with observations in the initial WarmUp period being dis-
carded while the link traﬃc and node usage status stabilize. Table 2 summarizes the system re-
source parameters.
The performance metrics include the average query response time, average link utilization, and
average node utilization. Each query is timed from the moment it is issued by the user, until the
returned result is fully processed by the user. The link utilization is calculated as the total amount
of traﬃc (Mbytes) per link, divided by the simulation time and link bandwidth. Lastly, the utili-
zation of a node is its cumulative busy periods over the simulation time.
4.1. Baseline experiment
The ﬁrst experiment is intended to establish a baseline for the three schemes, with the default
parameter settings in Tables 1 and 2. Fig. 7(a)–(e) plot the results against the query inter-arrival
time. As expected, UEPs veriﬁcation objects cause it to impose the highest load on the internet
link between the user and edge server, TCP is the most demanding on the edge servers due to
its parallel query execution strategy, while TCV shares the query results among the edge servers
and hence induces the heaviest traﬃc on the intranet links. As for user node utilization in Fig.
7(e), UEP performs only hashing operations there, which is signiﬁcantly cheaper than the signa-
ture veriﬁcations carried out by TCP and TCV. The utilization rate of the various resources, the
highest of which reaches only 30%, conﬁrm that this experiment models a resource-rich environ-
ment, hence the response times are limited only by typical processor and network speeds. In such
an environment, UEP outperforms the other two schemes because users connect directly to the
edge servers, without involvement of any intermediaries. However, UEP is not always the most
eﬃcient as we will see in the next experiment.
Table 2
System parameters
Parameter Description Default
SimTime Total simulation time 100,000 s
WarmUp Warm up time 5000 s
EdgeServ Number of edge servers 20
Users Number of users 20
Xspeed Node speed up factor 1
IntraBW Intranet bandwidth 1 Mbps
InterBW Internet bandwidth 1 Mbps
SignSz RSA signature size 128 bytes
SignGen RSA signature generation 4630 ls
SignVeri RSA signature veriﬁcation 180 ls
DigestSz MD5 digest size 16 bytes
HashRate Digest hashing rate 214.491 bytes/ls
Seek Disk average seek time 9000 ls
RotDelay Disk average rotational delay 4700 ls
Transfer Disk average transfer rate 7800 ls/blk
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4.2. Sensitivity to internet bandwidth
In practical deployment scenarios, the internet bandwidth is likely to be the resource that under-
goes the highest load ﬂuctuations. The next experiment is designed to proﬁle the sensitivity of the
various schemes to the available internet bandwidth InterBW. Fig. 8 shows that UEP experiences
the worst deterioration in response time with a reduction in InterBW. This is because the veriﬁca-
tion objects that UEP sends to the users are a lot larger than the compact signatures in TCP and
TCV, causing UEP to be highly sensitive to the internet bandwidth. In contrast, TCP and TCV are
dependent on the capacity of the edge server and the interconnecting network between them, which
are easier to provision. Among the two, TCP is the superior choice for the current resource settings.
4.3. Sensitivity to query selectivity
Next, we turn our attention to the performance impact of query selectivity, by varying it from
0.1% to 0.5% of DBSize. This leads to a corresponding growth in the size of the query results. As
TCV needs to distribute each query result to several edge servers for veriﬁcation, it experiences a
super-linear slow-down in response time as the intranet links quickly become saturated with traf-
ﬁc, as shown in Fig. 9(a) and (c). UEP and TCP, in comparison, degrade gracefully with larger
query results.
Another interesting observation is that, while UEP clearly has the lowest user node utilization
in the ﬁrst experiment, its utilization now exceeds that of TCP and TCV. The reason is that the
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veriﬁcation object is a tree structure with an integer height that is logarithmic in the query result
size (see Appendix A for the derivation). This height has increased from 1 in the ﬁrst experiment,
to 2 here. In fact, although the tree height remains the same from selectivity of 0.1% through to
0.5%, it does grow further at higher selectivity settings. With each increase in tree height, the user
node utilization of UEP would surpass TCP and TCV more and more. Therefore, UEP requires
the user clients to possess adequate processing capacity.
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4.4. Sensitivity to edge server speed
For the next experiment, we consider a system conﬁguration comprising a few fast processors
and many slower processors, which is common in practice. Fig. 10 shows the query performance
as the speed of the slower processors is varied with the XSpeed parameter. We observe that UEP
and TCP perform badly when the processor speed is low, because they depend heavily on the
availability of a large group of edge servers for query processing. Between the two, UEP is more
expensive as its query processing involves traversing a CB-tree with a height of 3, compared to
TCP that parses a B-tree of height 2. In contrast, TCV is clearly able to adapt to the resource var-
iation by executing most of the queries at the faster processors. This conﬁrms that TCV could be a
superior choice for systems that are conﬁgured with slow edge processors.
4.5. Sensitivity to k of n servers
Lastly, we examine the eﬀect of k in the (k,n) threshold RSA signature scheme, with diﬀerent
resource conﬁgurations. The results are shown in Fig. 11(a)–(c), where the resources considered
are the speed of the edge processors XSpeed and the internet bandwidth InterBW.
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In all the ﬁgures, as k increases, it aﬀects the results of TCV adversely. This is because, the
processing need at the edge servers and the intranet traﬃc (with the increasing number of VO)
increase with larger k. This leads to slower responses back to the users. Similarly, TCP
performance decreases, however the eﬀect is not as signiﬁcant as that compared to the TCV
scheme as the overhead introduced per k value is much smaller. Clearly, UEP is unaﬀected
through varying k as it does not depend on the threshold signature scheme.
In the ﬁrst setting, both the speed of the processors and the internet bandwidth are set to the
default values. The result is shown in Fig. 11(a). In this environment, the resources are in abun-
dance and UEP outperforms the other two schemes as it does not involve any intermediaries.
In the next setting, we look at the impact of having a low internet bandwidth at 0.5% of Inter
BW. In this environment, UEP performs badly as most users connect directly to the servers
through the internet and the large VO are returned to the users for veriﬁcation. This incurs greater
traﬃc in the internet that results in UEP performing badly. With UEP performing worse, TCP
now outperforms the other two schemes as seen in Fig. 11(b).
Lastly, we consider a system with servers comprising a few fast processors and many slower
processors varying from 0.01 to 1 XSpeed. In Fig. 11(c), we observe that TCV now performs bet-
ter than UEP and TCP for a number of k values. The reason for a slower UEP is because the pres-
ence of many slower processors are felt by the majority of the users. As for TCP, it performs badly
as it depends heavily on the availability of a large group of processors for query processing. In
contrast, TCV adapts better and outperforms the other two schemes for this system conﬁguration.
4.6. Summary of experiment results
Based on the above analysis, the relative cost-performance of the three data dissemination
schemes are summarized in Table 3. The ‘‘intuition’’ that have been conﬁrmed include:
• UEP imposes the highest veriﬁcation overheads on the client—the veriﬁcation object that is
sent to the client could be sizable, particularly for multipoint queries. Hence UEP works well
only if the client has adequate processing capabilities and network bandwidth.
Table 3
Algorithm comparisons
UEP TCP TCV
Security
No tampered values Yes Yes Yes
No spurious tuples Yes Yes Yes
No missing result No Yes Possible
No query result substitution No Yes No
Costs
Edge server processing Low High Low
Inter-edge server traﬃc NA Low High
Edge server-client traﬃc High Low Low
Client processing High Low Low
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• TCP has lower query execution cost per server than UEP and TCV, because it uses B+-trees
that have larger fan-out factors and hence potentially shorter tree height than CB-trees. How-
ever, this saving is not expected to oﬀset the cost increase from having k servers execute each
query simultaneously. Thus TCP requires abundant processing power at the edge servers.
• Like TCP, the TCV scheme diverts most of the veriﬁcation overhead from the client, but at the
expense of increased traﬃc between edge servers.
In addition, the experiments throw up a few interesting observations:
• TCV experiences super-linear slow-down in response time as query selectivity increases. Thus
TCV is likely not the best choice for applications that frequently pulls back sizeable ranges
of records.
• Slow edge servers aﬀect UEP and TCP much more than TCV.
Finally, we note that TCP requires the master DBMS to transmit only data changes, whereas
UEP and TCV additionally need the master DBMS to maintain and refresh the CB-trees on the
edge servers. Hence UEP and TCV impose heavier burdens on the master DBMS and its network
links to the edge servers.
Hence the three schemes are suitable for diﬀerent resource conﬁgurations; none is consistently
better than the other two.
5. Conclusion
This paper addresses the challenges of ensuring data security in an edge computing platform.
We propose two new schemes for verifying the query results produced by the unsecured edge serv-
ers. The schemes are based on the observation that if necessary a group of edge servers can be
running diﬀerent operating systems and protected by diﬀerent security products, thus increasing
the diﬃculty for attackers to compromise all the edge servers concurrently without being detected.
Our study shows that, where processing power is abundant at the edge servers, the scheme that
assigns multiple edge servers to execute each query and to collectively certify the result is the most
versatile, in terms of security guarantees and lower demand on other resources. In contrast, the
second scheme engages only one of the edge servers for query execution, while the other edge serv-
ers perform veriﬁcation and (collective) certiﬁcation. This reduces the load on the edge servers, at
the expense of increased traﬃc between the edge servers, and imposing extra work on the master
DBMS to generate some auxiliary structures to facilitate veriﬁcation. The two schemes present
diﬀerent security and resource trade-oﬀs from the existing work, and are useful for diﬀerent appli-
cation scenarios and resource conﬁgurations.
Appendix A. Analysis of the schemes
The analysis of the schemes is as follows: We will focus only on selection-projection queries, in
particular, (a) point queries that return at most one record based on an equality selection on a key
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attribute; (b) multipoint queries that may return several non-contiguous records based on an
equality selection on a non-key attribute; and (c) range queries that return a set of records whose
values for some attribute lie within a speciﬁed interval.
The cost metrics that we use to evaluate the data dissemination schemes include the query exe-
cution cost incurred by the edge processor(s), the edge server to edge server traﬃc, the edge server
to client traﬃc, and the client processing cost.
A.1. Costs of untrusted edge processor
The fan-out factor of the CB-tree is:
fCBtree ¼ jBj  jptrj  jDjjKj þ jptrj þ jDj
 
þ 1
This means that there is a space overhead of fCBtree · jDj bytes per node for storing digests.
Moreover, the height of the CB-tree is at least:
hCBtree ¼ logfCBtree ¼
#Rec
fCBtree  1
 
and the total number of nodes in the CB-tree is:
#Nodes ¼ ðfCBtreeÞ
hCBtreeþ1  1
fCBtree  1
& ’
A.1.1. Point queries
• Query processor
The query execution cost includes hCBtree + 1 I/Os for traversing the CB-tree, plus one I/O to
retrieve the result tuple, giving a total of hCBtree + 2 I/Os. (We count only the I/O cost as it dom-
inates the CPU cost.)
• Query processor to client network
In each CB-tree node on the path from the root to the result tuple, there are fCBtree  1
digests to be copied into the VO. Hence there are altogether (hCBtree + 1) · (fCBtree  1) of these
digests. Assuming that the edge server chooses to return the digests of the projected attributes
because the digests are more compact than the actual attributes (which could be binary large
objects), that adds #Col · (1  sfproject) digests. Including the signed root digest, the size of
the veriﬁcation object is ((hCBtree + 1) · (fCBtree  1) + 1 + #Col · (1  sfproject)) · jDj.
The expected result size is RecSize · sfproject. The edge processor to client traﬃc is the sum of
the VO size and the result size.
• Client
The client processing involves hashing the result values, then computing the root digest from
the VO. The latter includes (a) concatenating #Col attribute digests, plus one hash to derive the
digest for the result tuple at a cost of #Col · Cconcat + Chash; and (b) for each CB-tree node on
the path from the root to the result tuple, concatenating the digests of fCBtree children plus one
hash to derive the node digest; this part of the cost is (hCBtree + 1) · (fCBtree · Cconcat + Chash).
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A.1.2. Multipoint queries
• Query processor
The query result contains #Rec · sfselect tuples. If they are located through the CB-tree index,
the edge server would have to traverse the height of the CB-tree once for every tuple, with the
exception of the root which can be cached. Including the I/Os for retrieving the result tuples,
the query execution cost is #Rec · sfselect · (hCBtree + 1) + 1 I/Os. However, if there are too many
result tuples, then it would be cheaper to simply scan the table, at a cost of dDBSizejBj e I/Os. Therefore
the query execution cost is minð#Rec sf select  ðhCBtree þ 1Þ þ 1; dDBSizejBj eÞ I/Os.
• Query processor to client network
As for the VO, it would contain fCBtree  1 digests from every node that leads to a result
tuple. There are up to #Rec · sfselect · hCBtree + 1 such distinct nodes, subject to the maximum of
the entire CB-tree which has a total of dðfCBtreeÞhCBtreeþ11fCBtree1 e nodes. Including the signed root digest,
the size of this part of the VO is thus ½minð#Rec sf select  hCBtree þ 1; dðfCBtreeÞ
hCBtreeþ11
fCBtree1 eÞ
ðfCBtree  1Þ þ 1 j D j. In addition, the VO also contains digests for the projected attributes,
which expands the VO size by (#Rec · sfselect · #Col · (1sfproject)) · jDj.
Since each result tuple is RecSize · sfproject in size, the result size is #Rec · sfselect · Rec-
Size · sfproject. Adding that to the VO size gives the edge processor to client traﬃc.
• Client
The client processing involves (a) hashing the result values, then concatenating with the
digests for the projected attributes at a cost of #Rec · sfselect · (#Col · Cconcat + Chash); and
(b) computing the root digest from the VO at a cost of minð#Rec sf select  hCBtree þ 1;
dðfCBtreeÞhCBtreeþ11fCBtree1 eÞ  ðfCBtree  Cconcat þ ChashÞ.
A.1.3. Range queries
• Query processor
The query processing involves traversing down the CB-tree to reach the ﬁrst qualifying tuple,
then scanning the table till the last qualifying tuple. The query execution cost is
hCBtree þ 1þ dDBSizejBj  sf selecte I/Os.
• Query processor to client network
The VO contains digests in the nodes along the boundaries of the smallest subtree that covers
the result tuples, and the nodes from the top of the subtree up to the root of the CB-tree [20].
The height of the subtree is hresult ¼ dlogfCBtree #Recsf selectfCBtree1 e. There are 2 · hresult + 1 nodes along the
boundaries of the subtree, each of which contributes fCBtree  1 digests to the VO. From the top
of the subtree up to the root of the CB-tree, there are hCBtree  hresult nodes that adds another
fCBtree  1 digests each. Including the signed root digest, this part of the VO therefore has a size
of [(2 · hresult + 1 + (hCBtree  hresult)) · (fCBtree  1) + 1] · jDj. In addition, the VO also con-
tains digests for the projected attributes, which expands the VO size by (#Rec · sfselect ·
#Col · (1  sfproject)) · jDj. The result size is #Rec · sfselect · RecSize · sfproject, as with multi-
point queries.
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• Client
The client processing involves (a) computing the result tuples digests at a cost of
#Rec · sfselect · (#Col · Cconcat + Chash); and (b) deriving the root digest, from all the nodes
in the result subtree plus the nodes up to the CB-tree root, for veriﬁcation at a cost of
½ðfCBtreeÞhresultþ11fCBtree1 þ ðhCBtree  hresultÞ  ðfCBtree  Cconcat þ ChashÞ.
A.2. Costs of trusted cluster processors
The fan-out factor of the conventional B-tree is:
fBtree ¼ jBj  jptrjjKj þ jptrj
 
þ 1
and the height is:
hBtree ¼ logfBtree
#Rec
fBtree  1
 
A.2.1. Point queries
• Query processor
Since each query is executed by k processors, the total query execution cost = k · (hBtree + 2)
I/Os.
• Query processor to scheduler network
Assuming that the k processors transmit their partial signatures, but only one sends the query
result to the scheduler, the traﬃc is RecSize · sfproject + k · jDj.
• Scheduler to client network
This traﬃc consists of the query result plus the ﬁnal signature, and costs RecSize ·
sfproject + jDj.
• Client
The client processing here involves only hashing the result values for matching with the ﬁnal
signature.
A.2.2. Multipoint queries
• Query processor
The total query execution cost is k minð#Rec sf select  ðhBtreeþ 1Þ þ 1; dDBSizejBj eÞ I/Os, sim-
ilar to the corresponding cost for UEP except for the diﬀerent index tree heights.
• Query processor to scheduler network
The cost of sending k partial signatures and one set of query result is
#Rec · sfselect · RecSize · sfproject + k · jDj.
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• Scheduler to client network
The amount of traﬃc that is sent to the client is #Rec · sfselect · RecSize · sfproject + jDj.
• Client
The client processing here involves only hashing the result values for matching with the
signature.
A.2.3. Range queries
• Query processor
The total query execution cost is k  ðhCBtree þ 1þ dDBSizejBj  sf selecteÞ I/Os, again similar to the
corresponding cost for UEP.
• Query processor to scheduler network
The cost of sending k partial signatures and one set of query result is #Rec · sfselect · Rec-
Size · sfproject + k · jDj as with multipoint queries.
• Scheduler to client network
The amount of traﬃc that is sent to the client is #Rec · sfselect · RecSize · sfproject + jDj.
• Client
The client processing here involves only hashing the result values for matching with the
signature.
In the cost analysis for TCP, we have ignored the scheduler processing cost in combining k par-
tial signatures as that is negligible compared to the other cost components.
A.3. Costs of trusted cluster veriﬁers
The costs that TCV imposes on the various resources are similar to those for UEP and TCP, as
TCV is a combination of those two schemes.
• Query processor
Since the computation in combining the partial signatures from the veriﬁers is negligible, the
cost at the query processor for the three types of queries are the same as UEPs.
• Query processor to veriﬁer network
The query processor sends the result and VO to each of the veriﬁers. This generates k times
the traﬃc of UEP. The partial signatures sent back by the veriﬁers produce an additional traﬃc
of k · jDj.
• Query processor to client network
The amount of traﬃc sent back to the client here is the same as the TCP scheme.
• Client
The client processing here is the same the TCP scheme.
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